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Abstract
The number of casinos has grown substantially since 1990 as states and localities try to find
new tax revenue and jobs. After some initial successes across the United States and Canada, the
strategy has become even more popular. With a business so dependent on tourists, how has
the spread of casino gambling affected the returns communities get from hosting casinos?
Broadly speaking when neighboring areas pursue the same economic development strategy, is
any economic development actually occurring or are benefits just being transferred from one to
the other?
This analysis addresses that question and provides some preliminary evidence. Casinos have
positively impacted economic conditions at the county level, though the benefits are strongest
in the early stages of the casino's existence. Competition with other casinos has had negative
effects on the tax revenue individual casinos pay to states. More importantly, casino
competition has negatively affected economic development impacts of existing casinos, though
in most cases the net benefits are still positive.
Thesis Advisor: Paul Osterman, Professor of Human Resources and Management
Thesis Reader: Frank Levy, Rose Professor of Urban Economics
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Of course there are benefits to casinos. Why else would the industry have seen such exponential
growth without tangible benefits? In 1975 all of the casinos in the country were in Nevada. As of 2010,
there are over 500 casinos operating in 36 states. Growing acceptance of gambling as a recreational
activity is partly responsible. However, in the last 20 years states have used casinos as a way to fill fiscal
budget gaps, bolster tourism as other sectors declined, and provide jobs for their constituents.
In most places not named Nevada, opening a casino is not a matter of developing a business
plan, obtaining financing and permits, and then constructing a facility like other businesses. Opening
casinos may involve legalization, and afterwards, firms must competitively bid for a limited number of
gaming licenses. If a firm wins a license, it operates under limits on the amount and types of gaming
allowed, much higher tax rates than other industries, inconvenient site locations, and sometimes
restrictions on hiring and purchasing. State governments impose higher than normal requirements
because of the negative side effects associated with casinos (crime, bankruptcies, addiction, new
infrastructure, etc.). Firms tolerate the requirements because casinos have proven to be highly
profitable businesses. In addition to having relatively low operating costs, limited licensing and
deliberate placement give many of them regional gaming monopolies within the state.
Rhetoric surrounding casinos as an economic development strategy normally boils down to
taxes (either lower rates for residents or just more revenue) and jobs. Casinos are legalized and located
in communities where tax revenue and jobs are maximized. Given that goal, states place casinos and
build new casinos hoping to benefit from the gambling expenditures of citizens from other states. As
casino revenue goes, so goes a state's gaming tax revenue; states take a percentage off the top. As for
jobs, this relationship is not as straight-forward, but generally speaking the bigger the gaming business,
the more jobs it provides.
As casinos have multiplied and expanded, analysts have cautioned that the casino market could
be reaching its limits. Saturation occurs when there are so many casinos that every casino essentially
serves local clientele (Rose 1998). The 'convenience gamblers' likely choose to gamble at the location
nearest to their home. When new casinos open nearby, they do not go to casinos farther away, causing
those casinos to lose revenue. Many casinos were built in the hopes of attracting tourists. If due to
saturation, casinos fail to attract tourists from other states, they must depend on local spending to
support the operation.
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Much of the initial effort to allow casinos in State A comes from the success of casinos in
neighboring State B, particularly when many gamers in State B travel from places in State A. The lack of
casinos is viewed as a missed opportunity for revenue and jobs for State A's local economies. Building
casinos in State A should 'recapture' some of the revenue lost when residents travel to gamble. The logic
of recapturing revenue lost to other states is understandable. This thesis sheds some light on how
existing casinos might view new casinos', and reviews how states respond to and are affected by
legislative gambling changes in neighboring jurisdictions.
I hypothesize that newly built casinos within a certain distance of an existing casino have
negative effects on existing casino revenues. The more tourists a casino draws the more revenue it
generates. If my hypothesis is true, the economic development impacts from existing casinos will be less
than expected or simply decline when new casinos open nearby. This study can inform policy makers
either considering legalizing casino gaming or considering casino expansion.
The findings indicate that proliferation of casinos and competition amongst casinos has
increased the desire for most casinos to become resort destinations, while practically confining many to
become local serving. Particularly, governments now are more likely to prefer resort casinos, more likely
to accept them in urban places, and more likely to require concessions on local hiring and economic
development agreements. Casino competition has reduced the magnitude of economic development
impacts of existing casinos, but in most cases the net economic development impact is still positive.
There is little reason to believe or suggest that casino growth will slow down, but there is cause for
concern for rural areas that are both heavily dependent on casinos and most vulnerable to casino
competition.
This thesis is not about whether casinos are good or bad. Neither are societal impacts of casinos
and gambling the primary subjects of concern. These are very important topics, and are addressed
regularly in casino literature. Rather, the thesis examines the effects of neighboring jurisdictions
competing for the same economic development base using the same strategy. Conceptually, this thesis
would be very similar if the commonly chosen strategy involved convention centers instead of casinos.
The nature of casino legislation, recent developments in the industry, and the growing popularity of
gambling make casinos ripe for this type of analysis.
"Some legislators reported that out-of-state casinos attempted to block casino legalization in Illinois." (Pierce and Miller 2004,
106)
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Chapter 2: Review of Gambling and Casino Literature
This chapter reviews literature that addresses economic development within the framework of
casinos and gambling. The first section discusses economic development theory and ways to measure it.
Section two takes the theoretical concepts and puts them into the context of government objectives and
decision making. The third section reviews research that identifies determining factors of casinos'
successes as economic development tools. Finally, the last section discusses results from previous
studies that determined net impacts, costs, and benefits of casinos.
Economic Development Objectives
This thesis is concerned with economic development impacts of casinos and whether they are
positive, negative, growing, and shrinking. Before getting into whether or not they have changed, it is
worth describing what we mean by economic development impacts. Grinols (2004, p.79) refers to
economic development as the "enhancement of welfare and utility of households." Walker (citing
Schumpeter 1934, p. 66) lists 5 primary sources of economic development: the introduction of a new
good, introduction of a method of production, opening of a new market, new source of raw material,
and a new organization of any industry. Building on this, he suggests that since both consumers and
producers benefit from market transactions, an increase in the number of voluntary transactions
represents economic growth, in and of itself (Walker 2007).
North states the "success of the export base has been the determining factor in the rate of
growth of regions" (1955). Tiebout, using a definition of economic development based on increases in
per capita income, suggests that growth can be obtained without increasing the export base (1955). He
suggests that sometimes income growth can occur as a result of shifting resources toward residentiary
services and away from exportable services. If people in a region were paying a lot to import
recreational services (i.e. traveling to gamble), regional growth might occur if some decided to locally
produce recreational services instead of exporting relatively marginal widgets. Tiebout uses goldrushers
who became shopkeepers as an example. Tiebout draws a distinction between economic development
and economic growth, whereas North characterizes the argument as the difference between long and
short term economic growth. In North's framework, regions achieve long term growth because of a
comparative advantage in producing some goods and services which can be exported to other regions.
There are a few definitions of economic development on the table: a new good, a new export
base, import-substitution, or increase in welfare (represented by number of voluntary transactions).
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Next we have to determine whether any or all of these things have improved and identify a way to
measure the improvement. Wiley and Walker (2009) used retail property values near casinos and Wenz
(2008) used valuation of residential property near casinos to estimate the changes in welfare
attributable to casinos. Evans and Topoleski (2002) based their study on unemployment, total jobs and
percentage of adults in poverty. Popp and Stehwien (2002) measured economic development in terms
of increases in per capita income, net job growth, or declines in unemployment. Similarly, Morse and
Goss (2007) investigated casino contributions to economic development as defined by job growth,
income growth, and changes in unemployment rates. Given available data at the county level, jobs,
income, and unemployment were used most frequently in the cited literature and will be used in this
analysis.
It is important to determine if casinos lead to economic development, but research should and
does often include arguments about how they do it. Gambling, and tourism more generally, can be
thought of as exporting recreational services to consumers of other regions. In a review of gambling
impact studies, Rose (1998) highlights the difference between two schools of thought when he contrasts
restaurants and factories. Whereas restaurants are thought to serve local patrons and re-circulate
money throughout a region, factories export goods and bring in outside revenue. Chhabra (2007) noted
that casinos spur economic growth if they attract out-of-state money, while Walker (2007) believes that
simply adding a new good to as state's consumption menu spurs economic growth. He likens additional
casinos to new restaurants in a town, implying that the expansion of consumer choice results in growth.
The question of whether casinos are meant for the locals or for tourists drives the politics and discussion
around casino legalization, and ultimately the design and impact of casinos.
Goals of Casinos as Economic Development Tools
Grinols and Mustard (2001) outline at least nine social costs associated with casinos; so why
would governments get into this racket in the first place, particularly when they could pursue
development objectives through other means? Though casinos have become a popular economic
development strategy, they have the additional potential benefit of raising large tax revenues that fill
large budget gaps. Eadington (1999) listed five commonly cited economic benefits associated with
casino gambling's introduction into a region: jobs, investment stimulation, tourism development, tax
revenue, and utility gained for the consumers who enjoy gaming. Tax revenue is a strong motivation.
Pierce and Miller (2004) found states with poorer fiscal health were somewhat more likely to legalize
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gambling, and Elliot & Navin (2002) found that tax revenue from licensed casinos have become a staple
of many state budgets. Historically, states have tried to balance the positive and negative effects by
separating casinos from major population centers to protect against negative social impacts (Eadington
1998).
Casino legislation gets complicated and some of the goals become blurred. Iowa's goals were to
draw tourists and alleviate stagnation in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors (Morse and Goss
2007), but:
"One [reason for Iowa to get casinos] was particular to Iowa's situation:
under the terms of the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) of
1988, a number of land-based tribal casinos were about to open in
neighboring Minnesota and Wisconsin, which meant that Iowa would
feel the effects of casino gambling no matter what it did (von Herrmann
2006, 29)."
With tax revenue as one of the main objectives, several studies include impacts on other government
revenue, namely lotteries. Popp and Stehwein (2002) found that casinos negatively affect sales taxes,
while Seigel and Anders (2001) associated increases in slot machine revenue with decreases in lottery
revenue. Other studies linked casinos to more specific outcomes like distinguishing the area as a
convention center destination (Spectrum Gaming Group 2009). Even though there are several ways to
frame casino legalization, the discussion normally boils down to jobs and taxes.
If one approaches casinos as tax revenue generators (like lotteries) then the discussion turns to
who is taxed by jurisdiction and income level. If casinos are economic development tools, then
questions turn into "which tax rates applied to casinos yield the most benefit." First, casinos are placed
near state borders explicitly for the purpose of attracting out-of-state patrons (Wenz 2008), though
governments are increasingly inclined to license urban casinos, which tend not export gaming services to
tourists (Eadington 1998). As for tax rates, industry consultants suggest that low rates lead to greater
capital investment in casinos, leading to longer and more frequent visits (Spectrum Gaming Group
2009). Again, states balance the tax maximization issue with their social and political interests. Given the
concern about negative impacts, in most jurisdictions taxes are earmarked for public goods: public
education, infrastructure, and economic development programs (Rose 1998).
States solicit "impact studies" when casino legalization or expansion legislation is debated in an
effort to weigh negating effects of casinos. Expected benefits include tax revenue, increased economic
activity, employment, and positive spillovers to local business; expected costs include shifting spending
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from local business and the social costs of gambling (Wiley and Walker 2009). Impact studies try to
identify "new" jobs since, as Grinols and Mustard (2001) said, "there is no net gain to the economy from
shifting a job from one location to another unless it increases profits."
In his review of gaming studies for the National Gambling Commission, Rose (1998) illustrated
several methodological inconsistencies, some of which stem from a priori biases from both directions.
For example, proponents of casino gambling argue for the inclusion of consumer welfare gains when
weighing costs and benefits (Walker 2007). If the author is opposed to gambling on moral or ethical
grounds, change in consumer welfare from having more recreational options is not likely to be included
as a benefit in their analysis (Grinols 2004) . Conversely, proponents tend to dismiss the extent to which
negative social impact can be accurately measured and included in analysis.
The incentives for bias are large due of casinos' profitability (for private firms and governments)
and the stigma associated with gambling. The approach in this study is to review the effects of casino
competition using the most commonly cited objectives: tax revenue, jobs, and income.
Determinants of Casinos' Success as Economic Development Tools
Casinos are becoming more urbanized, and thus serving more local clientele. In light of this
trend, my analysis addresses whether or not economic development impact is still positive once the
geographic reach of casinos has been limited to local areas. This section focuses on how casinos effect
positive economic change, either through the choice of local versus tourist-oriented casinos, or through
effects on other economic activity. As you will read, the evidence is mixed on whether casinos need
tourists and whether their effects on other businesses are positive.
Some believe gambling acts as significant source of economic development if and only if it
attracts visitors or gets players to play more (von Herrmann 2006). Gambling opponents have argued
that if customers are local, casino development replaces other local businesses resulting in neutral
economic impact (Wiley and Walker 2009). This results in displacement or cannibalization of local
industry. Other research suggested that casinos foster related businesses such as hotels, restaurants,
gas stations, and other entertainment in areas near casinos (Evans and Topoleski 2002). Rose (1998)
wrote that even if a casino attracted only local residents, it would still generate multiplier effects
through their purchases, wage payments and tax payments.
Casinos cannot be characterized as easily as either "local" or "tourist" given the politics
surrounding them. We know casinos are located next to state borders so these casinos can attract out-
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of-state residents. These patrons will be local in the sense that they travel relatively short distances to
gamble, but they may be "tourists" in the sense they come from other states. Growth in this case may
be concentrated in one area in the region at the expense of another area in the region (Gabe, Kinsey and
Loveridge 1996).
Impact studies and research have identified several factors that affect casino typology (tourist
versus local) and performance (more versus less revenue). An Indiana Gaming Committee report
suggested that the Illinois gaming positions (number of slots and tables) limit has impeded investment at
Illinois casinos. High capital investment is associated with a resort-style, tourist driven casino. Casinos
have expanded to include hotels and conference centers to encourage tourism (Spectrum Gaming
Group 2009). In fact, firms that depend more heavily on casino revenues, rather than other services,
tend to have lower earning rates (Morse and Goss 2007). Both types of casinos have been subjected to
competitive pressures from nearby casinos. Resort casinos in Niagara Falls, ON have been at a
disadvantage compared to nearby properties in western New York which offer free alcoholic drinks and
allow smoking (MacLaurin and Wolstenholme 2008). Obviously, casinos substitute for other casinos,
which should reduce their effects. This is the point of the thesis.
The effects of casinos on other entities are expected to be largest on other forms of gambling,
businesses closest to the casino, and other forms of recreation. Walker and Jackson (2008) found that
casino revenues and lottery revenue in a state are negatively related. They also estimated that the
presence of horse racing in adjacent states, increases casino revenues in the state in question. Wiley and
Walker (2009) suggested that casinos act as complements to nearby existing businesses, given casinos'
impact on property prices. Seigel and Anders (2001) found evidence of revenue displacement in
entertainment and recreational services. Again, the choice of methodology can affect results, but these
results are most common in the literature.
Casinos' Economic Development Outcomes
Most evidence suggests that the net impact of casinos has been positive, but there are several
caveats. The expansionary effects of casino gambling on the average state have been largely diminished
over time (Walker and Jackson 2007). This could be due to competition or the casino effect dissipating
through the state gradually. Wiley and Walker (2009) reached the same conclusion using per capita
income as their growth indicator. Morse and Goss (2007) found that commercial casinos have positive
impacts on income, positive impacts on employment and negative impacts on unemployment rates. On
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the other hand Grinols and Mustard (2001) found no significant differences in unemployment decline
among Illinois counties that received casinos compared to counties that did not.
Tribal casinos' have had different experiences due to their legal structure and initial conditions
and have received special attention in the literature. In their review of tribal casinos in Minnesota Gabe
et al. (1996) found that the new tribal casinos had no significant impact on overall per capita income in
their counties. Even though there were positive effects on some industries, they postulated that the
industries were either too small to make an impact at the county level or that the wealth generated by
the casinos was spent outside of the county. Six years later Evans and Topoleski (2002) identified a
positive effect of casinos on employment to population ratio. Wacker (2006) identified benefits of
Native American casinos of a different nature. He noted the construction of schools and community
centers along with improvements in housing quality and renewed sense of pride. Wacker also noted the
difficulty of some tribal casinos to have an effect based on their remote location and low levels of
human capital. Like commercial casinos, tribal casinos prefer to locate near population centers.
The discrepancy among tribal casinos highlights the fact that casinos affect some populations
more favorably than others. In reference to casinos is Tunica, Mississippi von Herman (2006) wrote:
"Gaming revenues and the jobs it created may reduce unemployment,
raise incomes, and reduce poverty to some degree but it will take many
years to improve conditions that result from years of elite political and
economic resistance. On the other hand, higher tax revenues induce
more government spending which may result in higher income or more
jobs (p. 61)."
Also, many share the opinion that casino revenues filtered through government and private business
have done little to improve the lives of Atlantic City residents (Farrigan 2005). These results along with
the tribal experience underscore the need where casinos exist to invest public money in areas that
encourage long term economic development of people and places.
Conclusion
"Degenerate competition, or race to the bottom, has the ramification of decreasing profits and
causing an inordinate number of business failures if carried too far (Rose 1998, 24)." Using related
literature, this chapter has framed a discussion around economic development and how places hope to
achieve it through casinos. Additionally, it has shown the enablers and inhibitors of casinos' effects
along with the results in several places. Given past research results, there is potential for casinos to
encourage economic development. As market saturation increases and pools of tourists shrink, potential
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degenerate competition becomes a greater concern. The next chapter describes casinos' trends, styles,
regulations and spatial disparity in the context of increased casino competition since 1990.
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Chapter 3: Casino Trends and the Nature of Casino Competition
Casinos have changed substantially over the last thirty years, and even more since the new wave
of gambling expansion in the early 1990s. The spread of gambling competition has changed the location,
style, and audience of casinos. This chapter has five sections. The first goes through the chronology of
casino development by region and casino type. The second section provides descriptive statistics about
the qualitative changes of casinos. The third and fourth sections review casino trends by region,
including statistics on individual casinos' revenue and gaming options. The fifth section compares
geographic economic trends over the same period and relates regional economic performance to
growth in the casino industry.
Timeline of Casino Developments in the United States
Commercial Casinos
Regulation more than any other factor determines when, where, and how casinos develop.
Aside from laws addressing casinos on tribal reservations, gambling is a state issue. For years Nevada
had a monopoly on gambling in the United States. Nevada legalized gambling in 1931, hoping to attract
patrons from California (Morse and Goss 2007). In 1976, New Jersey legalized gambling but enacted
laws that put limits on the number of licenses, the location (Atlantic City only), and minimum operating
and financial requirements. New Jersey's strategy was to revive a tourist town that was suffering from
economic decline (Pierce and Miller 2004, 90). The regulations raised entry barriers so that only large
scale operations could open. This was designed with the idea in mind that it was easier to monitor fewer
larger establishments, while limiting the industry's exposure to organized crime if many small
establishments opened (Morse 2007 p. 98). Nevada, with its longer history of gaming, had by this time
established a gaming regulatory structure that was better suited to monitor diffuse and widespread
gaming operations; New Jersey feared small and mid-sized operators would be difficult to control. The
fear of organized crime has pushed several states toward strong oversight.
For most of the 1980s, Nevada and New Jersey were the only locations where casino gambling
was legal. They represent two models of casino gaming regulation. The first model is characterized by
less stringent restrictions, fewer regulations, and diffuse casino gambling. Nevada with its lower taxes
and lower administrative fees follows this model. A second model, involves a high level of regulation and
geographically concentrated casino development. The Atlantic City-only policy implemented by New
Jersey is the best example, but Colorado and South Dakota also use this model. The third model still
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involves high levels of regulation, but has deliberately dispersed casino development with specific
geographic restrictions. This last model was used by states that legalized casinos in the mid 1990s.
In 1989 and 1990, South Dakota and Colorado, respectively, began operating limited gambling in
which either casinos are restricted in the number of on-site slot machines, casinos are restricted in the
games they can offer, gamblers are restricted in how much they can bet at any one time, or some
combination of the three. Commercial casinos were (and still are) restricted to one town in South
Dakota (Deadwood), and three towns in Colorado (Blackhawk, Central City, and Cripple Creek). Similar
to New Jersey these casinos were meant to spur tourism in towns known as destinations for their
historic significance.2  Table 3.1 Casino Opening Dates by State
State First Casino Year Initial Casino Type
Beginning in the early 1990s, Illinois, Nevada 1931 Land-Based Casino
New Jersey 1978 1 and-Based Casino
Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, Louisiana, and South Dakota 1989 Limited Stakes Casino
Mississippi all began offering riverboatCasinoMisissppial bean ffein rierbatIllinois 1991 lRiverlxoatIockside Casino
gambling, almost exclusively along the Iowa 1991 RiverboatlDocksjde Casino
MIississippi 1992 Riverhoat/Dockside Casino
Mississippi and Ohio Rivers. The locations were Rhode Island 1992 Racino
Louisiana 1993 Ri'verNoat;IDockside Casino
decided based on states' intent to maximize Missouri 1494 RiverboatADockside Casino
West Virginia 1994 Raeino
revenue from out-of-state, rather than states' Indiana 1995 Riverboat Doekside Casino
Delaware 1995 Racino
intent to focus on existing tourist destinations. Michigan 1999 Iand-Based Casino
New Mexico 1999 Racino
In the early years of these operations, casinos New York 2004 Racino
Maine 2005 Racino
were subject to restrictions as to when Oklahoma 2005 Racino
Florida 2006 Racino
gambling could occur, how often the boats had Penns193ania 2006 Land-Based Casino
to "Jcruise", and gambling limits perC
South DAkotian18 Limrteds aksCin
patron/trip. 3 The cruises did not last long, gradually became more infrequent, and eventually were
discontinued in many places in favor of dockside gaming, where a casino facility is built on the water but
does not sail. Competition amongst the states led them to relax the restrictions, and subsequently made
gambling more about convenience than about tourism.
While Midwestern casinos were predominantly riverboats, racinos (racetrack and casino
combinations) prevailed along the eastern seaboard. Delaware, Rhode Island and West Virginia each
allowed their racetracks to have slot machines in the early 1990s. In each case, the slot machines were
2 Bourie (1995, p. 119). "All of the buildings in the downtown area are required to conform with the city's authentic 1880's
architecture and many of the casinos are located in historic structures."
3Early riverboats were required to leave the shore at some times or for part of the season because they were "cruise ships."
Though cruise ships are expected to cruise somewhere, this policy was intended to limit gaming opportunities of individuals
prone to be problem and pathological gambling.
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controlled by the states' lottery systems. Whereas the casinos in other regions tried to be tourist-
oriented, racinos were expected to be patronized by locals, or 'convenience gamblers', and were
designed more explicitly to raise tax revenue (West-Virginia-Intervieweel 2010). States with racinos
normally dedicated a percentage of the adjusted gross revenue to the support of the racing industry.4
For states that depended on racing for economic health, racinos were means of supporting a declining
but regionally important industry. A basic casino nearby could have hurt this industry if the two types of
gambling are substitutes. Slots at the track complemented the racing (through larger purses) and
protected an industry of local significance.
Land-based casinos are the most recent trend. Michigan (1996) and Pennsylvania (2004) passed
state laws allowing a specific number of casinos (American Gaming Association 2009). In Michigan, the
commercial casinos were all placed in Detroit. In Pennsylvania, the licenses were distributed to the
state's major cities. Michigan's introduction of commercial casinos broke their pre-existing compacts
with Native American tribes (Hill 2009). As a result, the tribes reverted to paying 2% of their adjusted
gross revenues to the state, instead of the 10% they had been paying prior to 1999. Unlike racino states
of the early 1990s, gambling was already present in the regions of the new casino states of Michigan
(tribal and Ontario casinos) and Pennsylvania (New York tribal casinos and West Virginia, New Jersey and
Delaware casinos). This is also true of New Mexico, New York and Oklahoma (tribal casinos). Since,
casino gambling was already prevalent, the deliberative question in these places was more about "how"
rather than "if."
Late adopting states benefited from the trial and error of other states. They designed their taxes
to entice more investment into new casino markets. They added restrictions on the employee hiring, in-
state suppliers, and local community agreements. They seemed to be less morally or ethically bound
when it came to limiting the harm gamblers could self-inflict. This last point concerns the casino location
decisions of state regulators. Whereas early casinos were relegated to rivers (riverboats casinos), rural
areas (most tribal casinos), or tourist destinations (Atlantic City, Deadwood, and Colorado casinos),
casinos have gradually moved closer to urban areas and even into downtowns of major cities (Detroit,
Pittsburgh, Philadelphia). Either the worry around gambling's negative spillovers to nearby areas has
4 State gaming commissions. For example, Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia each direct portions of gaming
revenue to horse racing funds.
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subsided, or regulators now believe the benefits outweigh the costs. In any case, casinos are a bigger
part of the urban landscape than they have ever been.'
Tribal Casinos
While commercial casinos were only
legal in Nevada and Atlantic City, a growing
number of Indian casinos had begun operating
under ambiguous legality by the end of the
1980s. The Indian Gaming and Regulatory Act of
1988 (IGRA) set up legal and regulatory
framework for states and Indian tribes, some of
whom had been conducting gaming activity
since the late 1970s.6 Under the legislation,
tribes needed approval from the host state, the
National Indian Gaming Commission, and the
Department of Interior to establish Class Ill
gaming facilities (United States General
Accounting Office 1997). The regulation
required tribes and states to negotiate
compacts that reflected their mutual interests.
The tribal casinos were not obligated to report
earnings or to pay taxes to state governments
as a matter of law, but depending on a tribe's
compact with the state, their casino often
agreed to pay a percentage to the state or
locality, sometimes conditional on the state's
exclusion of commercial casinos.
Figure 3.1 Tribal Casinos 1995
s As of 2010, the cities of Boston, Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, and Columbus were either considering or planning the
construction of urban casinos.
6 IGRA established three classes of gaming. Class I consists of social or ceremonial gaming. Class 11 gaming includes bingo, pull-
tabs, and punch boards, as long those games are legal under state law. Class Ill includes casino games, slot machines and pari-
mutuel betting.
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Figure 3.2 Tribal Casinos 2002
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Under the IGRA, if a type of casino gambling was legal in the state (even if just for charitable
purposes), tribes could operate that type of gaming on their own land. For Native American tribes,
casinos represented a valuable opportunity. Figure 3.3 Tribal Casinos 2009
Tribes could "sell a product", that was unique
to them because gambling was prohibited in
surrounding areas. Though Native American
gambling had been growing since the late
1970s (United States General Accounting A ' A
Office 1997), the new law legitimized the X
establishments that had been operating and
eventually allowed well known private casino
companies to operate tribally-owned facilities.
As of 2002, approximately 170 tribal casinos T160JCsinoihe
were in operation7 (Evans and Topoleski
2002); by 2009 that number had grown to
250. Since 1995, tribal casinos have accounted for over half of all casinos in the country. Figures 3.1,
3.2, & 3.3 show the growth in tribal casino gaming over time and by region.
Tribal casinos differ from commercial casinos along several dimensions. Most notably, tribal
casinos are overwhelmingly located in rural areas, even though some tribes have attempted to position
their casinos near urban areas. Secondly, unlike commercial casinos, tribal casinos are less frequently
restricted by regulatory limits on size. They can build casinos as big and bright as they choose. The
fees/taxes they pay are lower than taxes for commercial casinos leaving greater profits and more
potential for investment into the casino properties. Lastly, though they are normally geographically
limited only to areas on the reservation, within the reservation they have more latitude for casino
placement.
The somewhat random location of reservations led to disparate placement of tribal casinos
throughout the country and led to the introduction of gambling sooner than it would have otherwise
appeared. The presence of tribal gambling eventually affected states' placement of casinos and goals of
state gambling laws.
Evans, et al (2002) report in their paper that, as of 2002, more than 200 Indian tribes operated 310 gaming facilities. This
figure presented in this text does not include Class il gaming facilities.
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Casinos' Shifting Characteristics
Along with the location and type, characteristics of individual casinos have also changed over
time. With the progression of competition, just being in existence is no longer enough to remain viable
in many regions. Amenities and a variety of gaming options determine which casinos are most
successful, and consequently which places receive more benefits from their casinos. While this section is
meant to be descriptive, it also sets the stage for the quantitative analysis in future chapters and
introduces standardized definitions.
The thesis examines the effects of competition on casinos and localities in states that have
legalized casino gambling. When choosing criteria to delineate what is and is not a casino, I deliberately
chose numbers that ensured each of the commercial casinos remained in the sample. The identification
of some locations as non-casinos was necessary because some jurisdictions allow slot machines
practically everywhere and some casino guides list every location where gambling is available as a
casino.8 I exclude gambling locations from the set of casinos based on the following qualification: a
facility is a casino if by combining a) its total number of slot machines and b) five times the number of
table games it surpasses 400 gaming positions. If
(Total Slot Machines + (5 * Total Table/Poker games) >= 400)
is true, the facility is a casino. Cruise ships, small card rooms, small slot parlors or properties whose
primary purposes were not gaming were not considered casinos for this study. Either they require little
investment, have small effects, or offer gambling only at intermittent times.9 1" Data is also more
difficult to gather given the size or lack of jurisdiction in the case of international cruises. Casino City's
North American Gaming Almanac and the American Casino Guide are the sources for all casino charts.
8 This can include gas stations where owners may have up to 5 slot machines on the property.
9 In 2002, 88% of all slot machines in North America were in casinos with at least 400 slot machines. By 2009, this increased to
91%. Statistics based on Casino City's North American Gaming Almanac, 2009-2010.
In 2002, 34% of all table games (including poker tables) in North America were in casinos with at least 80 table games. In
2005, this increased to 40%. Statistics based on Casino City's North American Gaming Almanac, 2009-2010.
1 The cruise ships of Iowa, Illinois and Indiana are included however because their location and operation was consistent. They
eventually docked permanently.
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The physical growth of casinos from slot parlors, to casinos with slots and tables, to full-blown
casinos with gaming, attractions, and hotels has been incremental. Even as the total number of casinos
has grown, the percentage of them that offers table games (poker, blackjack, etc.) has increased steadily
over time. This has not led to an increase in the average number of table games at one location since
2002 (Figure 3.4). Over the same period of time the average number of slot machines has increased by
about 100 machines per casino. From a jobs perspective, table games are preferable because they
involve more labor in the form of dealers (Spectrum Gaming Group 2009). From a tax perspective, slot
machines bring in more revenue. Regardless of competing perspectives, casino operators prefer to have
both and see them as complementary, in the sense that one increases demand for the other.
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Dining and lodging are two commonly cited industries positively affected by casinos (Gabe,
Kinsey and Loveridge 1996). Aside from the slot machines and table games available, restaurants and
Figure 3.5 Average Number of Hotel Rooms and Restaurants at Casinos
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hotels are the primary draws for casino properties. The casino industry views these services as
complements to gambling and often offers them for free or reduced prices based on frequent gambling.
As competition intensifies, casinos add these amenities to distinguish themselves. In 1995, 26% of
casinos had hotels.12 That percentage has grown steadily over time as casinos have upgraded. Now, over
half (52%) of casino properties possess hotels. While the number of hotels has increased, the average
number of rooms has decreased slightly (Figure 3.5). This could be due growth in smaller casinos
opening hotels proportionate to the size of their regional market. In 1995, casinos averaged 2.41
restaurants on-site. That figure had nearly doubled by 2009. However, growth in hotels and restaurants
is not always a positive economic development impact, since these new establishments potentially
displace pre-existing local hotels and restaurants in the region.
In addition to restaurants and hotels, casinos increasingly host entertainment venues and
convention centers. This growth parallels the industry's rhetoric which tries to shift the focus from
gambling to entertainment. In 2002, 156 non-Nevada casinos had convention space on-site, and 329
non-Nevada casinos had entertainment venues. By 2009, 259 casinos had convention centers and 471
had entertainment venues. Among the categories discussed in this section convention centers are
1 All statistics about casinos in this section relate to Non-Nevada casinos due to data collection issues surrounding Nevada
properties.
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probably not the first things that come to mind when one thinks of casinos. However, due to
competition to become regional destinations, these amenities along with spas and golf courses, are
areas of growth within the industry.
Figure 3.6 Change in Total Slot Machines by State
Casino Growth by Region
Casinos have developed
disproportionately across the
country, largely due to state
regulation changes. However, a
substantial part of the growth
appears to be incremental, with
existing casinos upgrading their
properties. Incremental changes
vary geographically since the
pressure to upgrade is greater
in areas of competition, and
Change in Total Slot Machines
since the rewards of upgrading k S Cn CiNorth Amencon Gmrng A~onac 2002 to 2009
Total Slot Machine Change Gained 0 - 1500 Gained 6000 - 15000
Ldss more than 3000 Gained 1500 - 3000 Gained more than 15000
This section illustrates the Loss 1500-3000 Gained 3000 - 6000 No Slot Machines
Lost 0 - 1500
"zero-sum". competition that
goes on between states.
In the previous section, we saw that on average casinos added 100 slot machines from 2002 to
2009. On a statewide level (Figure 3.6), almost all states saw increases in the number of slot machines.
Interestingly, over this period states with well established gaming markets saw declines in the total
number of slot machines: Nevada, New Jersey, and Mississippi.'3 Each of those states saw declines of
over 2,500 (over 11,000 for Nevada) slot machines over the period. That represented about a 6% drop
below the 2002 figures. Also, each of the three is located in a region where a neighboring state or states
13 In 2002, Nevada, Mississippi, California, and New Jersey were the top 4 slot machines states, respectively. By 2009, California
and Oklahoma had surpassed Mississippi in total slot machines.
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added a significant amount of slot machines. Though this information does not prove anything, it does
suggest that expansion in one state slows, if not reverses, the growth of nearby states:
" California casinos added nearly 25,000 slots, in contrast to Nevada's loss.
* Pennsylvania and New York casinos combined added around 41,000 slots, compared to New
Jersey's loss.
* Alabama and Florida added a combined 25,000 slots and Oklahoma added 50,000 slots (though
Oklahoma may not represent direct competition with Mississippi).
The "next-door" effect is not as prevalent in the table game trends though large additions in table
games occurred primarily in two states: California and Oklahoma. The growth of both slots machines
and table games is linked to the expansion of tribal casinos within both states. Also, the largest positive
changes in convention centers and entertainment venues were associated with states that have a large
tribal casino presence.
Individual Casino Revenue Characteristics
The house always wins but some houses are winning more than others. States with limited
gaming, cruising requirements, or capacity limits, have smaller casinos and lower revenue at each
casino. Revenue depends on the facility (which is why so many are upgrading), proximity to large pools
Table 3.2 Average Revenue per Casino ($Millions)
1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008
New Jersey $367.5 S371.8 S395.6 $406.8 S396.4 $418.2 S374.8
South Dakota' S20.9 S55.3 554.1 $50.9 $66.6 S79.5 891.0
Illinois S91.0 S140.8 $147.3 $220.9 $199.9 S158.1
Ion~a S15.4 S67.7 881.0 $81.0 S85.1 $71.5
Colorado' S102.1 S166.7 S200.9 S256.1 S247.9 S233.8
Connecticut S342.1 S415.4 5718.1 5825.1 $842.0 S712.5
Rhode Island 853.9 $91.1 S152.5 $199.6 $216,6
Missouri 588.8 S122.3 S131.9 $145.6 S131.9
West Vireinia S19.6 S55.8 S161.7 $223.6 S203.6
Indiana 576.5 5202,8 S223.8 S241.7 S186.0
Delaware 576.5 S161.2 S204.8 5193.1 5178.1
Michiian S72.9 $55.7 S176.6 $168.0 S167.6
Nlaine $4.2 S45.8
Pennsylvania S193.8
a. - , tal adjuted~ g r erenue k cousyL
Hiasres are prcsnted in 2105 dollar,
.Smree: State Gaing1 Cornnin10:1 we Ass
of convenience gamblers, and the ability of the casinos or the region to market itself as a tourist
destination. Casinos have higher revenue when they do not compete with nearby casinos. The following
charts show casino revenue by region over time. The point is that when new casinos enter into a
regional market (normally from other states), competition results in the existing casinos losing revenue.
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Figure 3.7 Annual Casino Revenue: New Jersey, Eastern Pennsylvania, Figure 3.7 shows the total
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1000 Atlantic City casino revenue fell sharply.
Part of this decline is due to national
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revenue also declined) (Dadayan and
Figure 3.8 Annual Casino Revenue: Northeast Illinois, Southwest Michigan Ward 2009)1, but Atlantic 
City's fall




Figure 3.8 shows the same
information for casinos in the Greater-
Chicago region, but in this market,
No revenue ebbed and flowed. Illinois
-#-Chicago Area Illinois Casinos casino revenue fluctuates both because
-- Chiago Area Indiana Casino of introduction of new casinos and400 Revenue
--*-Southwestern Michigan
200 Casino Revenue policy changes. After an nitia steep
increase in revenue, the first Indianan
0
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 20012002 2003 2004 200S 2006 2007 2008 2009 casinos opened and Illinois' revenue
declined. From 1998 to 1999, the Illinois casinos saw another rise in revenue. This time it was most likely
due to open boarding (end of cruising requirement) (Garrett and Pakko 2009).15 In 2002, Indiana
followed suit by removing its cruising requirement and again, Illinois revenue fell. In 2008 a Michigan
tribal casino with 3,000 slot machines, 100 table games, and hotel opened right on the Indiana/Michigan
14 Dadayan and Ward, 2009. From 2008 to 2009, 28 of 41 states reported declines in gambling revenue.
15 in a study of the smoking ban's effect on revenue performance, the authors included a set of dummy indicators intended to
capture the effects of policy changes that affected casino revenue.
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border within minutes of Interstate 94. Both Indiana's and Illinois' casinos seem to have suffered as a
result.
Figure 3.9 shows the revenue history for two racinos in the northern panhandle of West Virginia,
which primarily serve customers from southern Ohio and western Pennsylvania, 16 compared to the
other two racinos which are farther south and closer to the capital city of Charleston, WV. In 2007,
casinos opened in Erie and Washington counties. In 2009, a casino opened in downtown Pittsburgh, the
largest city in the region. While casinos in southern West Virginia saw modest declines in casino revenue
(likely due to general economic trends), the northern panhandle casinos seem to have been significantly
affected by the new Pennsylvania casinos. By 2012 casinos will open in Ohio (Guillen 2010), negatively
affecting another customer base of West Virginian casinos.
Figure 3.9 Annual Casino Revenues: Northern West Virginia,
Western Pennsylvania, and Southern West Virginia Casinos existing casinos' revenues, and this
might be of interest to those who stand
500 -to lose their jobs. The economies of
Atlantic City and northern West Virginia
~400-
are more dependent on the casino
300 -industry for taxes and employment than
Philadelphia and Pittsburgh. As casinos
open in urban places, they supplant the
-.*-Western Pennsylvania C sino Revenue
1 rural and suburban casinos that have less
-U-Other West Virginia Casino Revenue
100Nhen e gin no Revenue industrial diversity and fewer
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
employment options.
Casinos and Local Economic Trends
One of the underlying assumptions of this thesis is that counties, cities, and tribal governments
expect to see positive returns from having the casino. While the states reap the tax benefits, the areas
hosting casinos expect to see localized impacts, both positive and negative. In some states (Indiana,
Mississippi) the ultimate decision of casino legalization rests with local voters. This section compares the
counties that have casinos to those that do not with two questions in mind:
e Are the two sets substantially different, in terms of initial conditions?
1 Information obtained from West Virginian Interviewee.
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. Has the set of counties with casinos seen the benefits for which they were hoping?
The section concludes by suggesting some preliminary relationships and evidence that previews the
upcoming quantitative chapters.
There were 100 more counties in Table 3.3 casino counties and Border counties
2007 that were home to a casino than there Number ofcounties with a 1997 2002 2007
casino 151 195 251
were in 1997 (Table 3.3). For every county
Number of counties that
that had a casino, there were about four bordered a county with a
casino 591 735 934
that bordered at least one county that had a
casino. The idea of "border" counties will Counties in sample 3078 3078 
3078
come up more often as discussion of Source:n ina inuna
proximate competition develops. Nearly half of all counties with a casino bordered another state,
reflecting the objective to "sell gambling" to people in other states. Demographically, counties with
casinos (Table 3.4) tend to be more populous and growing at a faster pace than counties without them.
Ethnically, there are no major discrepancies except for the proportion of American Indians, which is not
unexpected since casinos are
Table 3.4 Demographics by Casino County Status disproportionately located on
Casino Counties Non-Casino Counties
(2007) (2007) reservations.
Median Population 62.788 22,916
Jobs are a major part of the
Percentage with High School
Education (2000) 80.2% 77.1% argument for casino legalization. Places
Percentage with High School
Education (2000) 18.90% 16.20% that depend on declining industries may
Percentage Population be more likely to want casino jobs. Table
Change: 1990 - 21000 14.2% 10.8%
Percentage of Counties on a 3.5 shows employment by major sectors
State Border 47.8% 37.1%
Race in the initial years of the two research
White 79.2% 85.0% periods (1997-2002 and 2002-2007).
Black 7.8% 8.7%
Asian 1.3% 0.8% Though the manufacturing and retail
American Indian 5.5% 1
Some other race 6.3o sectors saw declines over the period,
Ethnicitv counties with casinos are not drastically
Latino (of any race) 8.8% 6.0% different from those without casinos.
beomortlikelinosaatpcasio5jobsTabl
SGovernment employment is higher in
Smerce: Bureau eI Fconrtrnw .4nalvi.%M 1; ,'' ('el Rurei casino counties, while non-casino counties
have larger manufacturing sectors. Government employment is not as sensitive to macroeconomic
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conditions; higher employment in non-governmental sectors could be indicative of stronger local
economic conditions in non-casino counties.
In most respects casino counties are not that different from other counties, but how have the
two sets changed over time? Table 3.6 shows three economic indicators, their baseline levels and
subsequent change over the two study periods. In all years, both unemployment and per capita income
is higher in the casino counties. When unemployment increased from 1997 to 2002, the rate for casino
counties did not rise as high as the rate for non-casino counties. When unemployment decreased from
2002 to 2007, the rate for casino counties fell more steeply than it did for non-casino counties. There
could be many reasons for this (urban/rural differences, more educated populations, upward economic
trends regardless, etc.), but for casino proponents, so far so good. The more striking numbers are in the
total job growth and per capita income growth. During both periods, job growth in non-casino counties
lagged behind job growth in casino counties. Also, per capita income increased by about $600 more in
casino counties during both periods.
Table 3.5 Industrial Composition by Casino County Status
Non-Casino Non-Casino
Casino Counties Counties Casino Counties Counties
1997 2002
Employment by Sector
Government 193% 16.4% 19.4% 16.7%
Manulacturing 10.4% 13.8% 8.4% 11.6%
Retail 16.7% 16.0% 11.1% 11.1%
Finance, Insurance, &
Real Estate 5.8% 5.1% 6.2% 5,7%
Construction 5,6% 5.7% 6.0% 6.3%
Counties in Sample 151 2,926 195 2,883
stource: Bureau ITeconomiic Anallsis
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Table 3.6 Economic Indicators by Casino County Status
Casino Non-Casino Casino Non-Casino Casino Non-Casino
Counties Counties Counties Counties Counties Counties
1997 2002 2007
Unemployment Rate 6.1% 5.5% 63% 5.7% 5.2% 4.9%
Per Capita Income S21.767 S20.211 S 25.547 S23,939 S32,508 $30.115
Chanec in Uncnployment
Rate 0 13% 0.20% -0.96% -0.88%
Total Job (irowth* 7 67% 48/% 8 4 5% 6 78%
Change in Per Capita
Income 54.322 S3.713 S6,813 $6,221
Counties in Sample 151 2,927 195 2,883 251 2,827
*Toal .hh Growth = (Change in Total Johsy 1tal .hnhs in Previous Period
Sotrce: Rureau of Economi Analysis
The casino industry is growing partly because elected officials see information like Table 3.6 and
hope to obtain those types of results for their home jurisdictions, in a relatively short amount of time. If
they believe casinos will benefit their constituents and spur local economic development, you cannot
blame them for trying. Increasingly cities and counties in close proximity to each other pursue this same
strategy. Are the benefits of one coming at the expense of another or are we actually witnessing
economic growth?
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Chapter 4: Casino Competition Effects on Casino Performance
Now for the fun stuff: the quantitative analysis. The choice of indicator is guided by what one
expects of casinos, but in almost every situation casinos are expected to bring in extra tax revenue.
Adjusted Gross Revenue is the best measure of tax revenue since states and localities receive a portion
of the casino revenue. I use regression analysis to characterize the effects of several factors on casino
performance. The results show that:
1. Proximity to major metropolitan areas gives casinos a competitive advantage.
2. There are agglomeration effects when casinos cluster, but beyond three miles the
casinos actually hurt each other if they are in close proximity.
3. Having more amenities helps.
4. Casino revenue goes through an initial growth period, but the growth flattens out over
time.
Quantitative Model for Casino Performance
The arguments about effects of added casinos relate to saturation and "recapture." Saturation
occurs when there are so many casinos that all of them essentially are convenience casinos. Recapture
occurs when a casino opens and attracts local clientele that used to gamble at nearby casinos in other
states. This happens because the new casino is closer to some customers, it has more to offer, or simply
because people like the variety. When the original casino loses customers, it can lose money, cut costs,
or invest and make its casino more attractive.1 Either can involve changes to economic development
outcomes, but the thesis is concerned with the overall effect of new competition. Since casino success is
believed to depend on tourists, most of the investments are designed either to attract more tourists or
to get tourists to spend more money when they come. If the region is not otherwise a tourist area,
greater investments in tourist attractions may not be feasible and may not occur.
Casinos do not always have this effect, however. On one hand they could be by miles apart,
splitting a customer base, or they could be within walking distance of each other and sharing the same
customer base (along with parking facilities, security, etc.). To one customer, seeing two casinos, each
with 2,500 slot machines, next door to each other, may be the same as seeing one big 5,000 slot
machine casino. When casinos are "clustered", it is possible that they complement each other, with
more variety in restaurants, entertainment and gambling options. The area is the "destination" instead
of any one casino. Examples of this can be seen in Atlantic City, NJ; Niagara Falls, ON; and obviously Las
1 Two riverboats in Indiana recently renovated their properties in response to mounting competition from Michigan Tribal
casinos and potential competition from Ohio.
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Vegas, NV. On the other hand, once the casinos are separated by a certain distance, the casinos'
characteristics affect where people choose to gamble, since it is harder to visit both during the same
trip. Hence, the analyses focus on each casino's offerings and pay attention to the attributes of nearby
competitors. For example, some people drive past older casinos to get to newer, palatial casinos even if
they are relatively close to each other.' 8
I should note that casino performance does not directly translate into community impact for
several reasons. First, just because the casino gets more revenue does not necessarily mean the
community sees any more benefit. Second, even if states collect more taxes, local investments and
disbursements do not necessarily increase. Third, the presence of hotels, restaurants, multiple gambling
options, and other attractions influence the casino's total employment and ultimately its profit but not
necessarily its gaming revenue. States are not necessarily partners of casinos, but casino proponents try
to convince them otherwise (Spectrum Gaming Group 2009, 7). Regardless, gambling dollars are very
important to many local and state budgets, so states do have an interest in seeing their casinos do well.
From a public perspective, it makes sense to examine the payments the states and
municipalities actually receive. From an economic development standpoint, the viability of the entity
and the commerce it generates are also concerns. I chose to examine Casino Adjusted Gross Revenue
because it is reported consistently from several sources, all casinos use some form of it, and in most
cases it is directly proportional to state payments. Adjusted Gross Revenue (AGR) equals the total
amount wagered by gamblers minus the total amount won by gamblers. In most states the taxes are
based on this amount, unlike most industries where taxes are based on profits. The higher the AGR the
more taxes the state receives.
Table 4.1 outlines the characteristics that I expect to affect casino revenue. The variables
describe aspects of the local area, state regulation, national (macroeconomic) trends, individual casino
attributes, and the attributes of the nearby casinos. Their source and predicted relationship with
revenue are also included. The data covers casinos that reported adjusted gross revenue from 1995
through 2009.This excludes most tribal casinos since they do not have to report their revenues or pay
taxes, though all tribal casinos are included in the analysis in situations where they compete with
commercial casinos. Below, I briefly describe the causal or incidental relationships with AGR of each
variable group.
18 Indianan-Interviewee2. The opening of a tribal casino in south western Michigan has negatively affected the casino in
Michigan City, IN even though the Indiana casino is closer to most patrons.
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Slots machines, table games, and hotel rooms are the most commonly reported features of
casinos and are expected to have the biggest effects on revenue. Slot machines (slots) are relatively
cheap to operate compared to table games (games), while hotel rooms (rooms) allow gamblers to stay
longer and spend more. Greater amounts of all three should lead to higher revenue and employment.
Table 4.1 Variable Definitions and Expected Effect on AGR
Effect on
































Number of hotel rooms on the casino property
Equals I ifthe casino has a hotel; Equals 0 otherwise
Number of gaming machines
Number of table games and poker tables
Number of restaurants on-site
Number ofentertainment venus on site
Equals I if the casino is a Native American casino; Equals 0 otherwise
Equals I if a race track is attached to the casino; Equals 0 otherwise
Amount of convention center area
Number of casinos within a 3-mile driving radius
Number of casinos wvithin a 3-50 mile driving radius
Number of casinos within a 50-100 mile driv ing radius
Distance to the closest competing casino
Distance to the closest maior metropolitan area minus the distance to
closest casino to that metropolitan area
Total competing slot machines within 3 miles of casino
Total competing slot machines within 3-50 miles of casino
Total competing slot machines within 50-100 miles of casino
Total competing slot machines within 50 miles of casino
Total Population within 50 miles of the casino
Hlighest statutory tax rate imposed on AGiR
Equals I if the state imposes an admission tax
Equals I ifthe state prohibits smoking in casinos; equals 0 otherwisc
Equals the number of years the casino has been operating
Equals the square of the number of years the casino has been operating
Equals I if the casino is in its tirst year ; Equals 0 othenvise
National Unemployment Rate
Universe: All casinos thai re)orted Adjuszed Gross Revenie Annually 1995 - 2010
Sources: Casino Citv's North Anerican Gaming Almanac. Bureau of Economic Analysis (REA),
UnitdStatesv Census, Bureau of Labor Statistics, State gaining commziission web.hsites, American Casino Guide 199-5-2007
For every casino in the sample, I include its attributes plus the distance to its closest competing
casino (CloseCas dist). If Casino Hunter is 10 miles away from a large casino with tons of gaming
















































options, Casino Hunter will likely be negatively affected. Similarly if guests can stay overnight at the
other casino, Casino Hunter should also lose business. If both casinos have hotels, the effects of each
casino's hotel rooms should cancel each other out. The farther away from Casino Hunter the
competitors are, the less likely they will have an effect. Having more competitors within convenient
driving distance results in lower "prices" and lower revenue. TotalSlotswithin3, TotalSlots_3to5O,
TotalSlots_50tolOO, and TotalGames_ within50 control for the relative quality of the casinos within
comparable distances. As discussed earlier, having a large number of casinos within "walking" distance
(3 miles) is expected to positively affect revenue.
As a casino town becomes a destination, specialized businesses emerge to support the industry
and complementary businesses spring up. Restaurants, entertainment venues and convention centers
are uses that often co-locate near casinos (Spectrum Gaming Group 2009, 58). Racinos are often
racetracks that have been renovated to accommodate slots. They tend to be convenience casinos and
should have less revenue. Though casinos try to attract tourists, having a large population of
convenience gamblers a short driving distance away positively affects revenue (Pop_50miles).
I include three regulatory variables since they have been shown to affect casinos' performance
(Garrett and Pakko 2009). High tax rates (TaxRate) imposed on casinos are expected to discourage
investment of the properties and ultimately affect the competitive position of the casino. Also, some
states impose an admission tax on casinos (AdmisTax) in addition to their gaming tax. Lastly, I control for
the effects of smoking bans (Smoking) some states have enacted at their casino properties.
The final set of variables represents temporal changes. The economic downturn beginning in the
late 2000s seriously affected several gaming entities, leading casinos to cut back expansion plans and in
some cases employment. Even amid these economic conditions, new casinos opened. I include data on
the national unemployment rate (Unemp/) to separate general trends in the North American economy
from the effects of increased competition from new casinos. Lastly, the casinos are working out kinks
during the first year (FirstYr), and their revenue reflects this startup period.
Data Sources
Data came from four sources. The comprehensive attributes of casinos come from Casino City's
North American Gaming Almanac, but their information only goes back to 2002. The almanac has
information on all types of gaming including Tribal casinos and Canadian casinos. I used the American
Casino Guide (1995 - 2007) to complement the data from the Gaming Almanac. This source, a tourist
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guide, listed every casino by state and type, and included general attributes for every property that was
in operation for the year. State gaming websites listed gaming revenue information from the date of
each casino's inception. Revenue was reported at least for every year, but often for each month for each
casino. Unfortunately, some states report by region and not by individual casinos (e.g. Cripple Creek, CO
casinos collective AGR instead of each casino's AGR). This data source, though direct, is limited to
casinos that are required to report to the agencies. Using this method, I collected information of over
100 casinos and racinos across 14 states dating back to 1980. I use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
regression to estimate the model and statistical methods designed for panel data. First I use a long panel
data set from 1995 to 2009 with an abbreviated set of explanatory variables, and then I redo the same
analysis using a shorter time period (2002-2009) but with more explanatory variables.'"
Competition Effects on Casino Revenue
In Chapter 3, it seemed casinos were trending toward urban areas, with lots of amenities. It
turns out that these characteristics play a huge role in predicting a casino's revenue. Table 4.2 shows the
results from the full panel. With annual AGR as the dependent variable, the number of casinos within a
3-mile driving distance was positively associated with revenue. This is due primarily to the very big
casinos in Atlantic City; if they are excluded, the number of casinos within a very short distance does not
significantly affect AGR. Though it mainly applies to Atlantic City, this result does support the notion that
within close proximity competing casinos can complement each other because they can be visited
during the same trip. The close proximity results suggest that agglomeration effects are applicable to
casinos. The other distance variables, Casinos_ 3to50 and Casinos_50tol00, are both negative. Casinos 3
to 50 miles away appear to draw from each others' base, and unlike those in the close proximity case,
this is an unambiguous result. The number of casinos within 100 miles has a negative effect, but it is
smaller than the 50-mile effect. This suggests the effects of competition phase out over medium
distances. For every competing casino between 3 and 50 miles away, an existing casino would lose
$15M annually, compared to $4M for a casino between 50 and 100 miles away.
19 The analysis is broken up into two sections. For the complete panel set, I used an abbreviated set of variables. Casino City's
North American Gaming Almanac's first year was 2002. That source includes an extensive list of characteristics (number of slot
machines, employees, casino size, etc.) by gambling establishment by year. I cried when I saw it. To gather data on casinos'
location and attributes before 2002, I used Steve Bourie's American Casino Guide, which contained information on hotels,
restaurants, and the presence of table games. This source was used to supplement the Gaming Almanac from 1995 to 2001.
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Table 4.2 OLS Regression for Annual Casino AGR (1995-2009)
Dependent: Annual Adjusted Gross
Revenue (2005 dollars. Millions) Coefficient Sid. Error P-Value
Casino within3 14.738 (2424> * 0.000
Casino 31o50 -15.423 (3.4 96) ** 0.000
Casino_50tol00 -4.040 i2. 206> 0.067
DisDisAdv (miles) -0.303 o W077 ** 0.000
Closest CasinoDist (miles) -0.1 87 (o loi 0.060
Num of Restaurants 3.653o Ssn * 0.000
Hotel (ves/no) 26.128 (5.si * 0.000
HorseTrack (ves/no) 24.587 123 79) 0.301
Dog Track (ves/no) -35.945 41. M 0.391
TableGames (yes/no) 8.958 is.366, 0.284
TrihalC'asino (yes/no) 53.101 (24 19> 0.028
UnemploymentRate -6.779 <1, J 7 * 0.000
Population within50 (millions) 28.937 (4.269 0.000
Yearly trend 8.375 <0,856> 0.000
Yearlv trenl sq -0.326 t0036> 1 * 0.000
FirstYear -66.541 10 / ** 0.000
Constant 115.033 120 76> 0.000
Numbe~r of bservations: [139 R-squared iihin: .2658
Nwnbr of Casinos: 103 R-squared herween: .6493
Num11ber of ime periad%. 15 R-squared overal!: 6121
In addition to the distance to competitors, I calculated a Distance Disadvantage (DistDisAdv).
This measurement compares Casino A's distance to its closest major metropolitan area, to the distance
from that metropolitan area to its closest casino. For example, if Casino A was located 50 miles north of
Los Angeles (its closest metro area), but the closest casino to Los Angeles was actually 20 miles south of
the city, Casino A's Dist DisAdv would be 30 miles (50 - 20), even though it is 70 miles away the other
casino. It turns out that for every 100 miles of disadvantage, a casino loses over $30M in AGR. When
translated into taxes, that amounts to $12M for a state that has a 40% tax rate on gaming revenue. As
casinos move to urban locations, this distance disadvantage grows for the older generation of casinos.
This puts existing casinos in a precarious position that new amenities are unlikely to overcome.
Even with a limited set of attributes, the casinos' characteristics significantly and positively
affected their revenue generation. The number of restaurants and presence of a hotel were significant,
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though the presence of table games was insignificant. Each of them positively affected casino AGR.
generally speaking, revenue is increasing for most of the casinos controlling for other factors, based on
Yearly Trend and Yearly TrendSquared. Specifically this result suggests that for every year in existence a
casino's revenue grows by $8.0M, but that the level of increase gradually declines over time (e.g.
revenue grows by $7.4M in the second year, $6.7M in the third year, etc.). This is consistent with the
regression on the shorter time period and earlier studies that suggest a leveling off of casino revenue
(Walker and Jackson 2007). I included UnemploymentRate to control for the national economic
condition; as expected high unemployment translates into lower AGR. Including the unemployment rate
helps control for the economic downturn that coincided with added competition in the latter half of the
Table 4.3 OLS Regression for Annual Casino AGR (2002-2009)
Dependent: Annual Adjusted Gross
Revenue (2005 dollars, Millions) Coefficient Std. Error P-Value
TotalSlots wviihin3 0.004 (0 *0 * 0.000
TotalSlots 310S0 -0.004 0 002) * 0.044
TotalSlots 50tol00 -0.002 (000i) 0.004
TableGanies within50 -0.210 w 09> ** 0.020
Dist DisAdv (miles) -0.395 (00 7i) " 0.000
Num of SlotA'Iachines 0.014 ((1o1)3) ** 0.000
Nmn of TableGanes 0.499 ,Ox2i ** 0.000
Nun of HotelRooms 0.032 (0. 0 1 0.002
Nuim of Restaurants 0.771 (( mX) 0. 197
Num of Entertainment Venues -2.813 (1 677> 0.093
Convention Sqfi -0.0003 W' 0.009
Tribalcasino yes/no) -16.256 (17.29) 0.347
Racino (ves/no 24. 1 76 15, 19 0.112
Smokingllan (yes 'no) -26.237 (7 (96) 0.000
Adnission Tax (ves/no) -17.744 m.// ** 0.029
HighestTaxRate 
-35.049 (1.54> * 0.059
UnemploymnentRate -3.5 12 (0 5 7) * 0.000
Population within50 (millions) 26.930 (3 402) 0.000
Yearl trend 6.366 1 307> * 0.000
Yearly trend sq -0.366 M054> * 0.000
First Year -80.821 (9.779) * 0.000
Constant 126.401 (16.52) 0.000
Number ol Observations. 643 R-squared within: .4308
Numzber of Cains: lo R-squared between: .?465
Number of time periods: 8 R squared overalt: .7316
time using more in-depth information on the same number of casinos, but with
decade. We can see the
effects of casino
competition on revenue
even accounting for bad
economic conditions.
The other variables are
included to account for
noticeable categorical
differences among
casinos. Proximity to a
population center
matters. An extra one
million people living
within 50 miles of the
casino, was associated
with $29M more in
revenue.
Table 4.3 shows
the results of the
second regression, this
fewer years. Instead of
It should be noted that they likely have a positive effect on profitability absent their effect on gaming revenue.
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assessing whether having table games matters, this information enables me to discuss the effect of the
amount of table games. The total amount of slot machines within 3 miles, between 3 and 50 miles, and
between 50 and 100 miles, all figured into the model significantly. In the longer data set, the number of
casinos within 3 miles increased AGR, while in the 50-mile and 100-mile zones, the effect of additional
casinos was negative. Here the rationale is exactly the same. The presence of many slots machines in
very close proximity complements other casinos and increases the AGR.
The amount of table games within 50 miles has a negative effect on revenue, with each
additional competing table game associated with a yearly loss of $210K to an existing casino. An
additional 100 slot machines within 50 miles (but outside of 3 miles), would likely result in losses of
$400K. These results take into account the fact that casinos are changing and improving as other casinos
open and expand. The controls for the basic casino characteristics (slot machines, table games, and
hotel rooms) are all significant, positive, and greater in magnitude than the same information for
competitors. That suggests that although casinos are affected by their competition, their own traits
ultimately wield more influence than other casinos' characteristics.
Surprisingly, the number of entertainment venues, restaurants, and the amount of convention
center space are either insignificant or in the wrong direction, even though all three are positively
correlated with casino revenue. One possible explanation for the lack of significance for these variables
is that their effects may not be reflected in gaming revenue, even though they positively impacts profit.
Alternatively, the return to these facilities may be too small for the model to detect.
Everything isn't all about the competition. State legislation plays a role in casino performance as
well. I included two regulatory dummy variables in this regression: one for the smoking ban in effect in
Illinois and Colorado, and one for states that had an admissions tax in addition to their gaming tax. Both
are negatively associated with AGR, with the smoking ban causing an average decline in annual revenue
of about $26M. The legislation was not intended explicitly for casinos; rather casinos fell into the list of
applicable sites where the ban was enforced. Studies have concluded that these regulations have
benefited casinos in neighboring states that do not have them (Garrett and Pakko 2009).
Finally the Distance Disadvantage was more pronounced when specific casino traits were
considered, while the UnemploymentRate had a more modest effect. Recall from the longer series, 100
miles of disadvantage translated into $30M of lost annual revenue. This estimation suggests $40M of
lost revenue for the same distance. The reduced effect of the unemployment rate, when we control for
the attributes of casinos, suggests that some casinos are more resilient to market downturns based on
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their amenities or their proximity to large populations. The Distance Disadvantage may be more
pronounced in a period when money is tight and travel budgets are slim. Tourism promotion has been a
stated goal of casinos for some time, but this evidence suggests a large part of the performance is driven
by local factors. Nearby casinos, nearby cities, short driving distances, and convenient policies all
contribute a great deal to the performance of casinos.
Effect on Casino AGR and Tax Revenue
Casinos' competition in areas of intermediate proximity to each other has eaten away at
revenue (and by consequence state tax revenue). For at least this set of casinos, revenue performance is
substantially driven by local (or regional) characteristics and is negatively affected by other casinos.
These results suggest that casinos (and by extension their host communities) will be affected by
competition. The results support previous findings that casinos' growth rates and effects die out over
time and confirm the relationship between distance to large populations and the profitability of casinos.
Since much of casino competition depends on relative distance, a new wave of urban casinos will put
rural and suburban casinos at greater disadvantages.
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Chapter 5: Casino Competition Effects Local Economies
From a policy perspective the primary reason to be concerned with the performance of casinos
is not for their sake, but for their relationship with the wellbeing of communities. In many cases, cities
begrudgingly let casinos into the area, charge millions in licensing fees, and then set very high gambling
tax rates. Still, casinos line up for licenses, while politicians debate expansion and further legalization. If
they are as successful as their increased expansion suggests, we should be able to identify their effects
on places. This section links the economic development impacts they are expected to have to the
analysis from Chapter 4 about how casinos affect each other.
Quantitative Model for County Economic Indicators
The first step in the analysis estimates the probability that a county in a given year (either in
1997, 2002, or 2007) actually has a casino. This is done to account for the selection bias between groups
of counties: those that have casinos and those that do not. Counties that eventually host casinos exhibit
a number of characteristics that make them ripe candidates for hosting a casino. States, through the
licensing process, have discretion over where casinos locate. For example, depressed areas struggling
with unemployment and shrinking budgets may like the idea of having a major employer and taxpayer
move into the region (Pierce and Miller 2004). The severity of conditions that led to a county getting a
casino subsequently may affect its economic response to the casino. Therefore this analysis includes two
parts: one model that predicts whether the county has a casino, and one model that estimates new
casinos' effects on a county's income, unemployment rate, and total job growth.
The output from the first model is a probability that is used in the second model. This probability
is based on the state regulations, proximity to other states, and demographics of the county, and
alleviates some of the selection bias associated with casino-related county economic performance.
Appendix 11 describes the characteristics used to predict the presence of a casino in a county.
There are two ways to think about identifying the effects of casinos on county economic
impacts. This discussion will eventually include all of the indicators, but for the moment let's talk in
terms of income. One method of identifying effects compares the average income in the county before
the casino existed, to the average income after the casino has been in operation. This method makes
sense; if the casino has a positive effect, we should see it over time. A second method compares
counties with casinos to counties without casinos at one moment in time. If casinos have positive effects
on income, counties with casinos should have higher average income than counties without them, all
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Table 5.1 Variable Definitions and Expected Effects on Economic Indicators
Effect on
Unempl. Effect on Effect on

























Equlas I if the county had a casino at the beginning of the period;
Equals 0 otherwise
Equlas I if the county bordered a county that had a casino at the
beginning of the period; Equals 0 otherwise
Equals I if the county was not a CasinoCounty at the beginning of
the period, but was a CasinoCounty at the end of the period: Equals
0 otherwise
Equals 1 i f the county was not a BorderCounty at the beginning of
the period, but wsas a BordetCounty at the end of the period: Equals
0 otherwise
Equals I if no casino existed within 10 miles of county borders in
period 1: Equals 0 otherwsise
Change in the number ofcasinos in the coutty over the period
Chance in the number of casinos wvithin 50 miles of the countv
border over the period
Pet. ofemployment in Construction
Pct, of employment in finance. insurance and real estate
Pet, ot employment in government & public administration
Pet ofemployment in manutacturing
Pct. of employment in retail trade
Pet. of etployment in proprietorship
Distance to metropolitan area of at least I million inhabitants
Pet. ofpopulation with a college degree
Pct. ot population with a high school diploma
Pct, change of population during the 1990s
Equals I if the county borders another state: Equals 0 othernise
Equals I if the period covered is 2002-2007: Equals 0 if the period
covered is 1997-2002
Inverse Mills Ration, selection bias correction for counties



















Sources- Casino Cit's Norh A merican Ganing Alnana. Bureau of Economic Anatlysis rBE A ).
United Sitaes Census. Boreau of Lahor Stati'tics
else being equal. However, all else is not equal. Places have varying initial conditions including
education, industry composition, initial income levels, population growth rates, and geography that
influence the income level of a region.
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Let us say we have identified two counties that have similar initial conditions and neither has a
casino. One county gets a casino, while the other does not have one. After five years, the county that
obtained a casino and has higher income than the other. If the counties maintained their other
similarities over this period, the difference in income levels after five years may be attributable to the
"treatment" that one of the counties received. Stated plainly, the increase in income is due to the
presence of the casino.
This research uses a similar structure to assess the impacts of additional casinos on counties that
already have them. Specifically, the change in income (from1997-2002 and 2002-2007) for counties
with casinos that saw no new casinos in neighboring counties will be compared to the change in income
for counties with casinos which neighbored areas that added casinos. This difference is the change in
per capita income that I attribute to the addition of casino competition of nearby counties.
Table 5.1 outlines the variables, their source, and predicted relationship with the dependent
variables, but it is worth discussing the meaning of each of the casino variables for clarity. CasinoCounty
is dummy variable indicating a county had a casino at the beginning of the period. It is the effect of
having a casino in the county. BorderCounty is a dummy variable signifying the county bordered at least
one county with a casino at the beginning of the period and represents the effect of bordering a county
with a casino. BecameCasinoCounty refers to counties that were not casino counties at the beginning of
the period, but were casino counties by the end of the five year period. This is interpreted as the effect
of obtaining a casino. Similarly, BecameBorderCounty indicates the county was not a border county, but
became a border county over the five years. BecameBorderCounty measures the effects casinos have on
nearby regions. BecameCompetingCounty identifies all counties that were both casino counties and
border counties at the end of the period, but were not at the beginning of the period. This is interpreted
as the effect of competing casinos, as separate from the effect of just having them or being near them.
Numof NewCasinos and Num of NewCasinoswithin50 represent the number of new casino openings
over the five year period within the county and within 50 miles of the counties borders, respectively.
These last two variables control for possible growth within the casino industry in a given place that
would not be captured by the dummy variables if the county's category did not change.
BecameCompetingCounty equals 1 if the county did not begin the period as a competing county
but ended the period as a competing county. A county will be in this category in one of three ways. First,
it can start as a border county and become a casino county. To calculate the casino and competition
effects for this county we sum the coefficients for BorderCounty, BecameCasinoCounty, and
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BecameCompetingCounty. Second, if a new casino opens in the county next door to an existing casino
county, one calculates the effects by summing CasinoCounty, BecameBorderCounty, and
BecameCompetingCounty. Third, a county could become both a border county and casino county during
the same period. In this case the calculation includes BecameBorderCounty, BecameCasinoCounty, and
BecameCompetingCounty. I give the range of outcomes when I describe the results of casino
competition on the indicators.
Casinos are not the only economic development engines at work however. Unemployment,
total jobs, and income obviously depend on more than just the presence of a casino. Accordingly, I
include several factors that affect the amount of change in the economic indicators, related to industrial
composition, demographics, and national trends. Including industrial composition (prior to the
treatment period) in the regression allows for the possibility that counties with a certain composition
tended to have greater changes in the economic indicator over the course of the experiment regardless
of whether they are in the treatment or control groups (Stock and Watson 2003). Education
characteristics prior to the treatment period were included because they are important determinants of
productivity and growth (Glaeser and Gottlieb 2009). Lastly, economic downturns especially affect
tourism-related industries because much of the spending presumably comes from disposable income.
Hopefully, these controls separate the effects of the casinos from the intrinsic characteristics of the
places.
Data Sources
The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) provided the annual county level indicators used in the
county portion of the analysis, as well as population estimates. Where the analysis required estimation
of population within "x" miles, ArcGIS mapping software was used to make the calculation based on
census data. The North American Gaming Almanac and ArcGIS were used to identify "casino counties"
by geocoded location of casinos. The quantitative models employ OLS regression analysis and use the
difference-in-difference estimator to discern the effect of additional casinos to two different groups:
competing and non-competing casino counties. All statistical analysis was performed using STATA.
Competition Effects on County Economic Conditions
This analysis uses the same data from Chapter 3 and expands on the descriptive analysis
presented there. The unit of analysis in the county and the economic development impacts are
measured by Change in the Unemployment Rate, Percent Change in Total Job Growth, Change in Per
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Capita Income ($Thousands). All changes took place over one of two five year periods: 1997 - 2002 and
2002 - 2007. Table 5.2 shows the results for all three regressions. Also, general economic trends for the
second half of the study period were better than the first. The Period2 dummy variable is significant and
positively associated with the favorable outcomes (high income, high job growth, low unemployment).
The Inverse Mills Ratio controls for the selection bias that occurs as a result of some counties being
more likely to be in the set of CasinoCounties than others." The overall message is that casinos have
positive effects on economic outcomes at the county level, but as they compete, a non-trivial amount of
the benefit is lost.
Casino Competition Effect on Total Employment
According to these results the effect on total employment growth of having a casino is positive
in the home county, but negative in nearby counties. Neither result is significant, their magnitudes are
small, and the effects largely cancel each other out. On the other hand, the effect of obtaining a casino
is positive and significant. Counties that obtained casinos saw total employment increase by 3.3%. The
effect on bordering counties was positive but not significant. Finally, the effect of becoming a competing
county was associated with a 2.2% drop in total employment (though this result is only significant 90%
confidence level). According to these results, if the county begins as a CasinoCounty and become a
BorderCounty, the cumulative effect is -1.6%. In the best case scenario where the county becomes both
a CasinoCounty and BorderCounty during the same period, the cumulative effect is 1.4% increase in total
employment.
The initial conditions (demographics and industrial composition) of the places matter, but the
general hypothesis is supported by this evidence. All of the industrial sectors were significant for this
indicator in expected directions. Having a relatively high dependency on manufacturing was associated
with negative job growth. Construction and retail are associated with high growth, while the magnitude
of government employment's effect on job growth was small compared to these sectors. Employment
was positively and significantly associated with strong population growth (PctPopChange_90s) during
the previous decade as well as highly educated populations (Col/Grad%). Additional casinos in and
around the county did not have a noticeable effect.
The results and explanation of Stage 1 of the model are reported in Appendix II.
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3.2814 (1 094) 0.0030
0.3347 (0. 485) 0.4900
-2.2114 (1.294) 0.0880
0.1611 (0096) * 0.0940
0.0204 (0.036) 0.5650
55.2994 (5,722) * 0.0000
4.0443 (2.09) 0.0530
-14.7688 (1 763) 0.0000
22.2930 (3 976) * 0.0000
5.2359 (1 503) 0.0000
0.0004 (0.002) 0.8260
0.1335 (0019) *** 0.0000
29.1103 (0.976) *** 0.0000
2.0776 (0.314) * 0.0000
-0.7212 (0.232) 0.0020
-3.3479 (1.853) 0.0710
Number of observations: 5500
Adj R-squared: 0.3805

















































%Change Per Capita Income
0.2325 (0.121) * 0.0550
0.2361 (0.070) 0.0010
0.7018 (0.262) * 0.0070
0.6083 (0.115) 0.0000




11.7485 (1.957) * 0.0000
0.5770 (0.522) 0.2690
-1.4870 (0.402) *** 0.0000
-0.6568 (0.906) 0.4690
0.0019 (0.0048) * 0.0000
0.0856 (0.005) *** 0.0000





Number of observations: 5149
Adj R-squared: 0.1903
F( 18, 5130)= 68.22
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Casino Competition Effect on Unemployment
It is worth noting some conceptual differences between unemployment decline and job growth.
Jobs are tied to places. If a new store opens in a city with 100 new positions, the city has 100 more jobs.
If fifty of the jobs are filled by people from surrounding areas, the unemployment rate of the city is only
decreased by the 50 people that now have jobs (assuming they were unemployed before). Cities do try
to encourage casinos to hire locally, but it is certainly likely that a percentage of the jobs go to people
outside of the jurisdiction, and possibly outside of the region.
The results for the change in the UnemploymentRate are similar to those for job growth, in the
sense that being a CompetingCounty did not yield a positive outcome. Both being and becoming a
BorderCounty was associated with a statistically significant decline in unemployment. For casino
counties the effect of obtaining a casino was stronger than the effect of just having a casino, but both
were insignificant. These results support the view that casinos benefit outsiders more than (or at the
expense of) their host communities. The presence of a casino was associated with better outcomes for
the BorderCounties than for the CasinoCounties, regardless of whether a new casino was added or
already existed in the region. Again the best case scenario, when casino competition is present, involves
becoming both a BorderCounty and a CasinoCounty. In this case net change in unemployment rate is a
decrease of .08%, which is still an improvement. In the worst case, an existing CasinoCounty becomes a
BorderCounty and experiences .16% increase in the unemployment rate. Casino competition at the
county level cancels out all of the unemployment improvement associated with having casinos.
Additionally, the number of casinos opened within 50 miles of the county is significant. Increasing the
number of casinos within 50 miles of the county results in higher unemployment for the host county.
For control purposes, all of the industrial sectors were included, again without any surprises.
However, both of the demographic variables included were in the wrong direction from the expected
outcome. Unemployment rates do not change as drastically as job and income growth, and so the
magnitudes of the coefficients are expected to be smaller for this model.
Casino Competition Effect on Per Capita Income
The presence of a casino in a county or neighboring county has a positive effect of the change in
per capita income. If a county or its neighbor obtains a casino, the county should see a positive, though
modest, increase in per capita income. If a county and its neighbor obtain a casino over the period, the
net effect on per capita income is an increase of $802. If a CasinoCounty becomes a BorderCounty, the
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cumulative effect is an increase of $333. Competing Counties however are associated with negative
changes in per capita income of -$508. This is the only indicator for which the effects of the competition
are less than the effects of obtaining the casino. Even though the competition effect negates much of
the income gains from obtaining a casino, per capita income is still higher if the county next door obtains
a casino. In other words additional casinos actually increase per capita income irrespective of
competition.
As for other variables, areas that experienced high population growth during the 1990s had low
per capita income growth. This could either reflect a high population of children, or an abundant labor
supply driving wages down. The education indicator is in the expected direction and significantly related
to income growth over the period.
Testing for Causality
Either casinos are having desired economic effects by increasing total jobs and income, or they
are locating in places that were already growing, in which case it should not be surprising that economic
growth and additional casinos are positively correlated. To test for this, I performed another probit
analysis that looked at the probability that a county would add a casino in Period 1 conditional on the
county's economic growth in Period 0. For example, I measured the change in a county's total
employment from 1992 to 1997 and compared that to whether the county became a casino county
between 1997 and 2002. If the counties that experienced a large percentage growth in total
employment were more likely to become casino counties than counties that experienced a small
percentage growth, then there is evidence that casinos locate in places that are experiencing job
growth. This suggests the casino is not causing growth. Rather it chose to operate in a growing area.
The results of the causality analysis (Table 5.3) show that growth in per capita income and total
job growth were negatively related to the probability that a county would obtain a casino, if any
relationship existed at all. In other words, areas that had high growth were less likely to become casino
counties than areas with low growth. This supports the notion that states use casinos to revitalize
struggling areas (Pierce and Miller 2004). These results were not statistically significant, but they do not
need to be. A positive relationship would have indicated a selection bias. We do not have enough
evidence to reject the null hypothesis that casino openings are independent of recent economic trends
in the county.
Page 44 of 61
On the third measure, unemployment, we do find a significant and negative relationship with
counties obtaining a casino. Counties that saw declining unemployment (which is good) were more likely
to get casinos. In one sense, this result casts doubt on casinos' effects on unemployment since there is
Table 5.3 Probit Regression Results for Casino Location Choice
Std. Std.
Probit Regression Coefficient Error P-Value Coefficient Error P-Value
Dependent Variable: Becam-teCasinoCounty
Economic Indicators
Cing Income 1-1 -0.0322 ,0241) 0.1820 -0.0545 tuo-3io 0.0720
C/ng Jobgrowth i-1 -0.1299 3/10> 0.6760 -0.2781 0492% 0.5730
Chng_UnenpI_t-I -5.5042 '1.72> *C 0.0010 -7.0629 e23!5) 0.0020
Other Gambling Variables
BorderCounty 0.3228 0os40) 0.0000 0.2826 092/A 0.0020
StateLotterv -0.0760 0.5780 -0.0581 0.7100
Demographic/Geographic Variables
Coll(Grad% 0.0227 if4053) * 0.0000 0.0237 o1;, ** 0.0000
Dist to AlajorAetro -0.0014 'oo> 0.0270 -0.0072 ( uo0) 0.2980
SlateBorder 0.0687 t o 0.3970 0.0938 t oxs 0.2900
Triba /A rea 6.5898 I 0.0000 7.0130 f.6-7 *** 0.0000
Industry Variables
Cug Constr_t-I 0.3889 i4 (iJ/ 0.9230
ChingFinRea/Est_t-l -4.0087 1,21s> 0.4410
Clhng Government t-i 0.6193 t2639 0.8140
Chng Afanuf i/-I -0.5930 ti.s62 0.7240
ChngRetail 1-1 -4.5487 i .i2t *, 0.0030
Constat -. 45 !m 0.0000 -2.6772 -1 6)* 0,00011
Number of observations: 6148 Number of observations: 497 1
Chi Squared: 143.04 Chi Squared: 142.90
Model P-value: 0.0000 Model P-value: 0.0000
evidence that casinos choose places with preferable (declining) unemployment trends. However,
obtaining and having a casino was not associated with a statistically significant decline in unemployment
in the previous model. Taken together, casinos likely have their desired effect on jobs and income
(independent of previous trends), while it is unclear if they have a preferred effect (if any effect at all) on
the unemployment rate in a county. In all cases, casino competition had a negative effect on the desired
economic development outcomes, regardless of whether or not those outcomes were positive.
Effect on Economic Development Impacts
Casinos initially have their intended effects of increasing total jobs and adding tax revenue to
the state coffers. Using broad economic indicators for analysis (and these indicators may not be the
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correct indicators to study), counties with casinos outperformed their counterparts. However, casino
competition diminished the positive effects seen by host counties. For casino counties that experienced
new casinos opening in bordering counties the economic development gains associated with total
employment growth and unemployment were completely negated. For counties that became casino and
border counties during the same period, the economic development outcomes were positive. However
there is concern for the future since the effects of having a casino are much lower compared to the
effects of getting a casino. Border counties that became casino counties received benefits but it appears
it came at the expense of their neighbors. The results resemble payoffs of the prisoners' dilemma. It is in
the interest of both a county and its neighbor to get a casino regardless of what the other does. If both
get casinos, the payoffs decline to a marginal and in some cases negative level.
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Chapter 6: Findings and Conclusions
Imagine a scenario in a small city with a several strip malls and main streets throughout the city.
As a part of the city's efforts to revitalize part of the city that is underserved by commercial business and
in need of investment, the city council decides to encourage development along a corridor within the
underinvested area. A market analysis determines the project to be feasible given the right mix of
tenants, design, and uses. After a couple of years, business at the new development seems to be
booming, but a few of the other strip malls around the city are struggling. It could be that the older
strips are struggling because of poor management or disinvestment, or it is possible that some of the
customers of the former strip malls have begun shopping at the swankier, newer development. If the
second case is true (where customers migrated), has any economic development occurred or has
economic fortune been shifted from one area of the city to the other? I use this framework to analyze
casino gambling.
The subject of this thesis is casino gambling, but the question it sought to answer was concerned
with economic development strategy when neighboring areas compete. Specifically, casinos have been
strategically placed in areas throughout the country to accomplish a number of goals. Higher tax
revenue without higher taxes rates, more jobs, more tourists, more investment, and revitalization of
declining areas are all among them. The goals would be perfectly defensible if not for the fact that
gambling has negative side effects. The stigma associated with gambling has limited its presence to
certain regions and subsequently provided regional monopolies for some casinos in an era with growing
acceptance of gaming as a pastime. Study after study quoted the need for casinos to attract tourists in
order to achieve maximum economic benefit, but as the number of gambling locations increases
gamblers travel shorter distances and the number of tourists at casinos declines in favor of local
clientele.
Qualitative Impacts
The trends from chapter 3 show a steady march of gambling across the country, including rural
Native American reservations and downtowns of major cities. The initial focus for many areas was a
revival of tourism. For some regions, this is still the focus as casinos increasingly have hotels and
attractions to encourage out-of-town guests to stay longer and spend more. In addition to the attraction
of more tourists, casinos try to extract as much value from the customers as possible. So while the
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gambling has grown (total slot machines, table games, and number of casinos), so have the non-
gambling activities (restaurants and entertainment venues).
The casinos are bigger. They have more restaurants and the restaurants serve different types of
food at different price levels. The machines are enhanced: at newer casinos, they have cup-holders and
television screens built-in to the machine, just in case the patron was inclined to get up. The shows and
activities entertain the people who don't like to gamble, but visit the casino with people who do gamble.
Competition has not just led to lower profits; it has led to a different type of casino that more frequently
is located in a different kind of place than original casinos.
States have internal tension with regards to gambling. In one sense additional tax revenue
without higher tax rates on residents is wonderful and most places will not turn away additional jobs if
they can get them. However, states and localities do fear the negative impacts of casinos on their
communities and, if we consider casinos a tax-raising scheme, states would prefer to tax outsiders
rather than their own residents. The tax revenue argument is beating the negative externality argument,
as the nation's acceptance of gambling increases. With tax revenue and jobs for the unemployed driving
the debate, casinos will continue to locate in cities. This leads to indirect economic development
impacts because, since the casinos are in cities, abutters and communities are now in play. Community
development agreements, local hiring agreements, economic development funds, and funds for'special
projects are increasingly sought after given the initial conditions of casinos' host communities.
When I began this research, I expected to find a percentage decline in some measure of
economic performance due to casino competition. I did. But I also found that competition spurred
secondary economic development impacts related to new casino markets.
Quantitative Impacts
The analysis showed that initial benefits to casinos were large, but that the benefits associated
with them diminished over time as the market matured or as competition intensified. I found that the
returns to getting a casino were positive and significant in terms of income growth and employment. In
the case of unemployment reduction, neighbors to counties that had a casino fared better than the
counties with the casinos. However, after a county had a casino for a while, the positive changes of
getting the casino leveled off resulting in muted benefits of having a casino. Trends in casino revenue
showed the same pattern, with steep growth initially and then relatively stable revenue unless outside
forces affected it.
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Casino competition reduced the economic development impacts of casinos at the county level,
even though the overall net effect for each of the indicators tended to be positive. In every case the
effect of casino competition among counties negated part or all of the benefit from being near casinos,
having casinos, or obtaining casinos. For counties that have casinos, if a county that borders them
obtains a casino, the new casino will result in 1.6% drop in total employment, .16% increase in their
unemployment rate, and $300 increase in per capita income. In two cases all of the economic
development impact is wiped out by additional casinos, while in the third the casino enhances the
county's position.
Regardless of casino type or size, the proximity of other casinos affects the revenue of existing
casinos. A casino's revenue performance is driven by its own characteristics, like the presence of
multiple gambling options (table games and slots), hotels, and restaurants. These were all associated
with higher revenues. The presence of other casinos within very close proximity (within 3 miles) had a
complementary effect and boosted the revenue of an existing casino. Once outside of the 3 mile radius
however, each new casino detracted from existing casinos' revenue. For every competing casino
between 3 and 50 miles away, an existing casino would lose $16M annually compared to $4M for a
casino between 50 and 100 miles away.
Another finding emphasizes the role of convenience in this economic development strategy.
With so many gambling locations, casinos are increasingly serving local clientele and so having a large
population within comfortable driving distance (50 miles) is very significant. According to my findings, it
is also advantageous to be the closest casino to a major metropolitan area. For every 10 miles a casino is
at a disadvantage, $3M to $4M of revenue is lost. These two findings about competitive effects with
respect to geography have negative implications for existing casinos in rural areas, which include many
tribal casinos. As casinos locate in urban centers, the rural casinos are marginalized and the
communities that depend on them face greater uncertainty.
Results in Context
In light of these results it is difficult to argue that casino gambling should continue to expand or
that a city/state should forego jobs and tax revenue so that another neighboring jurisdiction can reap
the benefits of casinos. National policy is not applicable since gambling is a state issue and collaboration
between states seems unlikely. Yet, the net economic benefit when competitive effects are included is
still positive, which suggests that new casinos are not just displacing the economic impacts from existing
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casinos, even though the existing casinos are harmed. So while states, cities, and casinos compete to
determine the winners and losers in the gambling industry, it appears that in many cases, places are
breaking even (or a little better) in terms of economic development impacts.
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Appendix I: Case Studies
While the effects of new additional casinos in regions are addressed quantitatively in this thesis,
this appendix introduces case studies that put some of the results in context. The goals and reasons
behind allowing and encouraging casinos vary across regions. Similarly, regional strategy changes
depending on the events in other areas. The analysis of the rhetoric, studies, interviews and
developments are not meant to be conclusive; rather, this section is meant to illustrate what actually
happens on the ground.
The three cases, western Indiana & Eastern Illinois (CASE 1), Southwest Pennsylvania & northern
West Virginia (CASE 2), and Massachusetts & Connecticut (CASE 3), were chosen because each
represents interstate competition at a different stage of development. The first case is an example of
interstate competition in its mature stage. The second reviews actions taken by neighboring regions,
where one state had gambling for a period time and was joined by a second state. The third case
describes the success factors of the first state along with the initial goals of the second state.
The relationship between casino regulation and competition is dynamic, so this section
describes the actions that states, casinos, and localities take to improve their position. Reactions include
everything from gambling expansion to higher tax rates. The first section establishes timelines and the
geographic context of all of the casinos. This second part describes the regulation changes made in
response to competition, while section three illustrates differences in casino quality. Section four
reviews states' dependency on gambling and identifies conditions that make regions vulnerable. Indirect
local effects of competition are discussed in the fifth section. Lastly, changes in the horseracing industry
are discussed in the context of casino funding. Ultimately the cases should illustrate the aspects of two
questions:
1. What does competition look like, locally and regionally?
2. What have been or may be the effects of this competition on places?
Background and Initial Casino Development
Illinois's first casino dates back to 1991; Indiana got its first casino in 1995. Both initially chose
the riverboat gambling model and currently face competition from other neighboring states, including
tribal casinos in Michigan and Wisconsin. The number of casinos in the Chicagoland area has not
changed (5 in Indiana, 4 in Illinois), though two racinos opened in central Indiana in 2007 and Illinois has
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considered a Chicago-area casino for at least a decade (Indiana-Intervieweel 2010). All of the casinos
are within a 90-minute drive of downtown Chicago.
West Virginia has had its same stable of racinos since 1998. The two in the northern panhandle
(Mountaineer in Chester, WV and Wheeling Island in Wheeling, WV) depend substantially on gamblers
from outside of the state and are the subject of this case. In southwestern PA, there have been two
recent additions. Meadows Racetrack and Casino opened in 2007 in Washington County; Rivers Casino
opened in downtown Pittsburgh in 2009. All of the casinos are within a two-hour drive of Youngstown,
OH; Wheeling, WV; and Pittsburgh, PA.
Connecticut's first tribal casino, the Mashantucket Pequot's Foxwoods Casino, opened in 1993.
In 2010, it was the world's largest casino. The smaller, yet still gigantic, Mohegan Sun casino opened in
October of 1996. Massachusetts has no casinos but recent proposals suggest possible locations at the
sites of their racetracks which are in Plainville, Raynham, East Boston, and Revere. The major cities
within driving distance are Boston, MA; Providence, RI; and New York, NY.
From the casino regressions, we saw that a distance disadvantage matters, but really a
convenient (short, direct, safe, etc.) drive matters more. In Northern West Virginia, the road
infrastructure makes the Chester casino more accessible to Ohioans, while Wheeling Island is more
accessible to Pennsylvanians because of Interstate 70. After the two casinos opened in Pennsylvania, the
Wheeling casino was significantly impacted, while Mountaineer has seen less drastic declines (West-
Virginia-Interviewee2 2010). When Ohio casinos open, the interviewee expected that Mountaineer
would be more severely impacted. In the Chicagoland case (CASE 1), the distance disadvantages are not
as pronounced. The casinos in Illinois are in cities well outside of Chicago, so they are no more
convenient than the Indiana casinos for much of the metro area. However, casinos in northwest
Indiana are riverboats and not immediately accessible by interstate. A recent proposal would have
allowed one of the Gary casinos to move inland next to Interstate 80/94 (Ruthhart 2010). Second
generation casinos have the advantage of considering proximity to major highways when placing the
casinos.
Gamesmanship and Relaxation of State Gaming Regulation
Interviews and reports suggest legislation at the state level is designed to exploit weaknesses in
other states legislation. New casinos can offer promotional free play, in which customers receive offers
in the mail to gamble a certain amount of money for free if the person comes to the casino by a certain
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date 2. West Virginia taxes this free play as AGR; Pennsylvania chose not to do so, probably in an effort
to encourage its casinos to attract as many new customers to the new casinos as possible (West-
Virginia-Intervieweel 2010). Similarly, when Illinois began open boarding23 it had a brief advantage over
Indiana casinos. Three years later, Indiana also eliminated its cruising requirement. With the exception
of marginal tax rates, casino regulations like these have become more relaxed as casinos competition
has increased. Across all the states, analysts and politicians are increasingly cognizant of the strategy
and tactics being employed by other states.
Connecticut is an anomaly in this list of states because it did not choose to have casinos. Under
the IGRA, states must negotiate with tribes in good faith when tribes wish to open casinos. The
agreements can include regulatory payments (for added security, gambling addiction services, etc.),
promises of exclusivity (moratorium on other forms of legalized gambling), and percentages of revenue
(Connecticut casinos pay 25% of slot revenue to the state (State of Connecticut 2010)). If Massachusetts
ever opens casinos, the regulatory game will likely be one sided because Connecticut cannot so easily
change its agreements with the tribes.
Changes in Casino Characteristics
Instead of talking about gambling locations, the deliberations in the advanced competition case
(CASE 1) are concerned with "what else?" There is a sense that the gambling industry is no longer
growing, declining, or growing at a much slower pace. The focus is on amenities, hoping that the
revenue will be maintained by encouraging investments in ancillary services like golf courses, spas, and
convention centers that draw more tourists to the state. In contrast, CASE 2 developments are still
concerned with adding gambling options and the quality of the gaming experience. The first
Southwestern Pennsylvania casino opened in 2007; in late 2007 the northern West Virginia casinos
added table games to maintain a competitive advantage (Rutherford 2007). In response to budget
shortfalls, Pennsylvania approved table games at its casinos in 2009 (Barnes 2010). They are expected to
open in mid 2010. If Massachusetts gets casinos, they will have quite a challenge matching the size and
quality of the tribal casinos in Connecticut. In CASE 3 the competition may remain geographic only.
I visited the Mountaineer Casino in Chester, WV and the Rivers Casino in Pittsburgh. Slot
machines in West Virginia were about what I had expected. There were rows of them with different
22 Think of it as a gambling gift certificate.
2 Under cruise requirements riverboats could only be boarded at certain times. Open boarding allowed riverboats to remain
dockside and allowed gamblers to board at their leisure.
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themes and different denominations. The slot machines at the Rivers Casino, were equipped with cup
holders and miniature television screens. Both of these additions seemed to encourage longer periods
of gambling and are probably considered more convenient for gamblers. There were other differences
between the two properties, but I mention this one to illustrate the point that newer casinos often
come with state-of-the-art facilities that further disadvantage older casinos. Obviously investment and
reinvestment are part of business, but for rural convenience casinos, the level of investment needed to
remain on equal footing would be substantial.
Gambling Dependency
There is a concern expressed in political debates about the increasing prominence of gambling
dollars in fiscal budgets and the increasing presence of gambling in everyday lives (Ruthhart 2010).
From 1997 to 2009, revenues from gaming accounted for 4 to 6% of Connecticut's general fund
(Spectrum Gaming Group 2009). Foxwoods and Mohegan Sun are among Connecticut's top employers
(Legere 2008) and accounted for roughly 15% of net job growth from 1992 to 2007 (Spectrum Gaming
Group 2009). In 2008, approximately $583M of Indiana's $12.9B dollar budget came from gambling
revenues (Indiana State Budget Agency 2009). In West Virginia, 9.2% of the state's general revenue
came from gambling revenue in 2007 (Dadayan and Ward 2009); only Nevada's gambling proportion
was higher. These examples illustrate the degree of dependency on gambling particularly for the states
without the major metropolitan areas.
The number of casinos a state has typically does not increase very much once the original
licenses have been claimed. On the politics side there tends to be a statewide resistance to expand,
even though some local politicians may be in favor of more gaming for their districts. Economically, the
regression analysis showed that revenue is probably maximized in close proximity to population centers.
As the regulations stand however, licenses are tied to places and not likely to move. While Indiana is
more fiscally dependent on gambling (particularly from Chicago residents), Indiana's gambling industry
is not as threatened because the regulations in Illinois discourage investment in casino properties
(Illinois-Intervieweel 2010). Casinos in northern West Virginia unfortunately are at a regulatory and
distance disadvantage compared to their counterparts in Pennsylvania.
24 Indiana is the exception, and they have only added two racinos in twelve years since the original casinos opened.
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Casino Competition Effects Local Impacts
At the beginning of this exercise I was concerned with spillover businesses and how they would
be affected if competition resulted in a decline in traffic to the locality. However, none of the interviews
identified spillover effects from casino traffic except for gas stations.2 s As previously stated, the casino
offers food, lodging, and entertainment inside. Most of the investment near casino properties tends to
be done by the casinos. Other businesses are at a disadvantage compared to the casinos when it comes
to selling complementary services. One official cites the "ability of the casinos to comp" patrons with
free rooms, meals, etc. as the determining factor of what deters outside investment in these areas
(Indiana-Intervieweel 2010). In downtown Pittsburgh, investment is occurring around the casino, but it
is more coincident to the casino's location next to the regional sports stadia (Pennsylvania-Interviewee-3
2010). In any event competition is probably not significantly affecting barely discernible spillover effects.
From a jobs perspective, casino employment has an obvious interpretation, but often displaces
other jobs within the community. If casino jobs are better than the alternatives (jobs with fewer benefits
or no jobs), losses in casino employment are significant to communities. If casino jobs are of relatively
poor quality and/or the jobs do not go to locals, it is uncertain whether jobs losses due to competition
are a casualty.
Community and economic development funds are larger concerns in local contexts than
economic spillovers. These are more common in urban areas (i.e. Pittsburgh and East Chicago) and can
either be lump sums or percentages of gaming tax.2 Rivers Casino in Pittsburgh will pay the North Side
Leadership Conference $1M annually for three years beginning in 2010 for residential and commercial
development in North side neighborhoods (Rotstein 2009). In East Chicago, IN the Ameristar Casino
devoted 3.75% of its annual revenue to economic development, of which 1% goes directly to the city
(Hinkle 2010). Local development agreements vary by locality, even within the same state, but funds
based on percentages are subject to the same competitive forces that drive state tax revenues
downward. Lump sum payments are more likely to be resistant to competitive pressures.
Racing Industry
A local development section would not be complete without mentioning racinos. Support for
racetracks was a common theme across many of the regions. In addition to setting aside for money for
25Casinos are expected to have complementary effects on restaurants service stations and free-standing retail (Wiley and
Walker 2009).
These funds are separate from local shares of gaming or admission tax revenue.
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state and local general budgets, economic development and tourism, Illinois, Indiana, West Virginia, and
Pennsylvania specifically designate funds for the support of the horse racing industry (Massachusetts is
proposing to co-locate slots with the racetracks). While there is little overlap between the two forms of
gambling (Walker and Jackson 2008)2', racetracks have argued that their businesses suffer when slots
are offered in other locations (Pierce and Miller 2004, 104). To compensate the industry for its loss,
funds are set aside to encourage breeding, increase the prizes for winnings and allow for more races.
Why support gambling in one industry at the expense of another? In some regions (Illinois,
Indiana, and West Virginia), horse and dog racing have a long histories leading to concentrations of
commerce focused on racing. To the extent that horseracing is more labor intensive than a casino, the
transfer of money makes sense from an economic development/jobs perspective. Horseracing has been
bolstered by the purse increases provided by the slot machines. If slot revenue declines, horseracing
funds drop which jeopardizes some of the growth seen in the racing industry.
Conclusion
Interstate competition occurs over several dimensions including regulation, amenities, and
geography. Due to initial conditions like presence of large metropolitan areas and level of dependency
on gambling revenues, some areas are more vulnerable than others. Several places had local
development agreements (mostly urban) or racetracks supported by slot revenue (mostly rural). If the
agreements are based on percentages of total AGR, they are subject to the same casino competition as
state tax revenues. Casino competition should lessen the impacts of these funds.
27 Walker and Jackson suggest that casinos and racing actually complement each other instead of acting as substitutes.
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Appendix II: Heckman Correction for Selection Bias
Given the regulation, politics, and economic conditions that go into a casino locating in a
particular county, there is potential for selection bias. Though every county could potentially be affected
by the presence of a casino some places could never have casinos because of this selection bias. In the
case of the casinos, the magnitude of change in economic indicator could be related to self-selection of
that county into the treatment group (i.e. counties that have comparatively more to gain from casinos
are more likely to allow them). Using the Heckman method (Stock and Watson 2003), I specify a first
stage probit equation with a binary dependent variable indicating that a county has a casino
(CasinoCounty) at the beginning of both of the time periods (1997 and 2002). For explanatory variables I
include economic trends from 1992 to 1997 and from 1997 to 2002, respectively for the two periods,
along with regulatory (StateLottery) and geographic variables (Dist toMajorMetro).
Table A-1 Probit Regression Model for Selection Bias
Coefficient Std. Error P-Value
Dependent Variable: CasinoCountv
Economic Indicators from Previous Period
Cling Income t-1 0.1170 10. 44> 0.008
Chng Jobgrovth 1t-I 0.0104 tows!> 0.981
(ingUnempi t-I 5.1055 C.922> 0.081
Other Variables
'%oChntg Pop 1990s 2.4108 10, **94 * 0.001
StateLotert 0.4795 tw 4v) 0.297
Disl to AajorMeiro -0.0018 a0,t62 0.318
StateBorder 0.7789 a'4 * 0.003
TribaLArea 7.7311 '2 w) l 0.000
Constant -2.5455 a. *** 0.000
Number of observations: 6145
Wald Chi Squared: 24.34
Model P-value: 0.0020
The results of the first stage (listed in Table A-1), suggests that being in a state with a large
percentage of Native American land (Triba/Area) was most significantly related to the presence of a
casino. Also, growing areas (%ChngPop1990s), counties on state borders (Border), and counties with
growing income (ChngIncome t-1) were also likely candidates to have (not obtain) casinos. I use the
results of this probit regression to calculate the Inverse Mills Ratio (MillsRatio), which is included in the
second stage of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions in Table 5.2.
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